Zanu PF’s pesky succession question still remains open

By Ntando Dumani | 2h ago

President Emmerson Mnangagwa (right) and his deputy Constantino Chiwenga

QUITE an eventful past week, dear reader! Indeed, the 21st Annual People’s Conference of Zanu PF happened in Bulawayo and produced a well-rehearsed and endless list of resolutions about the economy, social services and poverty eradication, climate change and the environment, war veterans, infrastructure, engagement and re-engagement, amongst others.

While these issues are significant, we are not holding our breath. They are not likely to be followed by any concomitant action beyond the empty rhetoric that Zimbabweans have become accustomed to.

The week was eventful indeed, but not in the sense of what occurred, but rather what crucially did not!

What did not happen, dear reader, is that the resolution to extend President Emmerson Mnangagwa’s term of office beyond 2028 did not sail through. But before I delve into this important subject, let me address another problematic resolution, which may have flown under the radar masked by the significance of the 2030 political agenda.

Bane of party supremacy over govt

One resolution stated, “The party and government should establish a comprehensive framework that ensures the principle of party supremacy over government is followed.” This raises concerns about the creeping shadow of authoritarianism.

Zanu PF’s ambition to emulate a doctrine mostly pursued by one-party states like those in China and North Korea and one-dominant party systems like Cuba, Vietnam and Eritrea is becoming more overt.

These models share two defining traits: entrenched dictatorship or an authoritarian system of government.

Keep Reading

The drive to place the party above the government signals a troubling move toward an inflexible and potentially oppressive and intolerant governance model, undermining Zimbabwe’s democratic ideals.

If we apply the “veil of ignorance” in this proposition, I do not think its proponents would be comfortable with it if it were to be exercised by another party that would have ascended to power, other than Zanu PF.

This proposition reveals an unsettling arrogance. There is a belief that Zanu PF has the sole right — of divine proportions — to govern Zimbabwe. Should a new party ascend to power, would Zanu PF be happy with it exercising supremacy over the government?

Allure of hegemonic tendencies

This resolution is not purely rhetorical; it signifies an ideological pivot, where the party not only guides policy as informed by its manifesto, but also dominates governance.

This will erode democratic mechanisms and weaken public institutions within Zimbabwe. The practical allure of this proposal for Zanu PF elites is to use it to entrench its hegemony, permeating all levels of government and thereby guaranteeing unbridled power. The “party supremacy” doctrine risks compromising Zimbabwe’s already fragile democracy by shifting the government's accountability from the people to the party. The problem is that the party is not accountable to the people but to itself!

This will result in further erosion of civil liberties and institutional independence. All well-meaning Zimbabweans, including members of Zanu PF, must resist this.

Third ‘termists’ setback

Back to matters of succession: Patrick Chinamasa, the party’s secretary for Legal Affairs, burst the third “termists” bubble after announcing that Mnangagwa had declined the request to continue beyond 2028.

The conference had proposed a resolution to the effect that “The President and First Secretary of Zanu PF, His Excellency, Cde Dr ED Mnangagwa’s term of office as President of the Republic of Zimbabwe and First Secretary for Zanu PF be extended beyond 2028 to 2030.”

This was the resolution that all eyes, from within and without, were interested in. For the third time, Mnangagwa made a public announcement (this time through Chinamasa) that he was not interested in staying longer at the helm. That is well and fine, commendable even.

Too early to celebrate

One question that remains stubbornly stuck in the corner of my tools of analysis is why Mnangagwa entertained the third-termists in the first place.

Why would he allow the proponents of that agenda to continue campaigning all these past months without instantly nipping it in the bud? Even more disturbing is why he would allow the resolution to pass up to announcement at the conference, only for him to reject it afterward.

It could be that he was in on it from day one but wanted to maintain plausible deniability until he thought he had enough political capital and will to push it through.

That has always been his modus operandi. He maintained a distance and plausible deniability during the Tsholotsho Declaration and the Lacoste faction heydays in the race to succeed Mugabe.

The Kagame playbook

The proponents of the third term could well be taking a cue from the Paul Kagame (President of Rwanda) playbook, where he is asked to extend his stay in power and keeps rejecting until he gives in to the “will of the people” at the end. After all, who is he to say no to the people? Vox dei, vox populi.

In other words, Kagame is an unwilling participant in his continued stay in power who only succumbs to the will of the people. We have heard that one from Mugabe before!

Those pushing for a third term had his blessings all along. He may have realised the headwinds were too strong against the proposition and decided to abandon the mission.

Or it may just be a tactical retreat for his camp to gain ground for a more spirited fight in the 2027 elective congress of Zanu PF.

The faction will regroup, and the push for 2030 will continue. Despite the announcement at the conference, the slogans urging him on will not subside. The push for an extension of his tenure will most likely re-emerge with force as 2028 beckons.

Expect regrouping and recalibrated strategies among loyalists who see Mnangagwa’s political longevity as their ticket to maintaining influence and power. Zanu PF’s power brokers have historically shown a capacity for patience and adaptation.

Atonement, making of a godfather

What is clear, though, is that if he genuinely is not interested in the term extension, he will earn the goodwill of many ordinary Zimbabweans.

He would have atoned for any sins of commission or omission that his long political career obviously has. And he would have secured a legacy characterised by serious infrastructure development and the rejection of the allure of holding on to power so tantalisingly presented to him by his supporters.

Beyond that, in Zanu PF, in the unfolding game of succession, Mnangagwa has positioned himself as the ultimate “Godfather” within Zanu PF, wielding the power to anoint his preferred successor.

Whoever gets his endorsement in the succession race will gain more traction than his/her rivals within the party. The gift of the high office that third-termists were offering to him would be his to give to whomever he anoints as heir.

The dogs of succession unleashed

While Mnangagwa solidifies his influence as the party’s godfather, potential successors have long begun to position themselves. Each contender brings a unique background and political base, and their varied alignments and motivations point to a contentious succession process. There are several likely contenders in the race as it gains momentum towards 2027.

Constantino Chiwenga

The Vice-President, a central figure in the 2017 coup, remains the most obvious and visible candidate for succession. The announcement by Mnangagwa may be viewed as paving the way for him to succeed boss, considering he is the only remaining coup general who turned politician. However, realpolitik is more complex than that.

Despite his military backing, Chiwenga’s lack of a solid grassroots political base constrains his influence within Zanu PF. We should remember Professor Jonathan Moyo’s counsel at the height of Mugabe’s succession race that the vice-president is appointed by the president. And that appointment is not anointment; hence, the vice-president does not have an automatic claim to the throne.

Indeed, his military credentials offer him credibility and the backing of the generals who have always been power brokers in Zanu PF’s succession matrix since pre-Independence.

Yet he is somewhat isolated within party circles, particularly from the Mnangagwa-aligned faction. He is a lone wolf in a succession pack full of Mnangagwa-aligned contenders. Chiwenga’s standing as a military figure may also limit his appeal to a civilian population weary of military involvement in governance.

His best and most likely move would be to build an alliance with the G40, which is still deeply embedded in Zanu PF fabric.

Chris Mutsvangwa

Mutsvangwa is very ambitious and influential in Zanu PF. A prominent war veterans’ leader and long-standing ally of Mnangagwa, he played a pivotal role in giving the coup a veneer of civilian legitimacy — putting lipstick on a pig, so to speak.

Mutsvangwa is ambitious, and party insiders know his presidential aspirations. His background as an ambassador to China during Zimbabwe’s “Look East” policy has afforded him strong ties with Beijing, which remains a crucial ally for Zimbabwe and Zanu PF’s political and economic survival.

However, his open opposition to Chiwenga suggests he may struggle to reconcile his ambitions with the military’s influential role in Zanu PF’s power structure.

His other weakness is that he is too loud — mercurial even. Sometimes, his self-assured hubris and arrogance tend to alienate many elites whom he would need in his bid.

July Moyo

Known as a long-standing Mnangagwa confidante, Moyo has cultivated an image as a dependable Mnangagwa ally, dating back to the Tsholotsho Declaration, a significant event in Zanu PF’s factional history.

In government circles, Moyo is often regarded as a de facto prime minister, overseeing various strategic functions and initiatives.

His loyalty to Mnangagwa and his influential position within the Lacoste faction give him substantial leverage, although he lacks clear military backing and could struggle to establish broader grassroots appeal.

His presidential bid would face opposition from those viewing it as solidifying the Karanga hegemony, which Mnangagwa is already accused of.

To Mnangagwa, he would be a safe pair of hands and would also continue Mnangagwa’s agenda. This is important considering that in recent years; incumbents in Southern Africa have had a strenuous and mostly acerbic relationship with their predecessors.

General Philip Valerio Sibanda

General Sibanda has cultivated the image of a professional and disciplined soldier. He is the first ex-Zipra to be Commander of the Defence Forces and, could be on his way to becoming the first ex-Zapu President of Zimbabwe.

This would explain his sudden albeit unconstitutional appointment to the Zanu PF Politburo, which was later reversed after public outcry. It clearly is an attempt to introduce him to civilian politics and groom him for greater political responsibilities as his tenure draws closer to an end in the next two years.

As an ex-Zipra official with significant military experience, he embodies the Unity Accord’s ethos, making him an appealing choice for those advocating for Zapu representation within Zanu PF.

However, Sibanda’s relative lack of political experience may prove challenging, especially in navigating Zanu PF’s factional complexities.

His potential ascension represents an attempt to balance regional representation, but it remains uncertain whether he can build a solid support base within the party.

Saviour Kasukuwere: The wild card

A de facto leader of the G40 faction currently, Kasukuwere’s ambitions are well known, and his influence is substantial, especially among younger Zanu PF supporters and within the G40-aligned networks.

His potential return to Zanu PF and alignment with Chiwenga or another faction could shake up the current power dynamics, offering the G40 faction a seat at the table.

Kasukuwere’s return is contingent on striking a deal with the right faction. Yet, his outsider status could galvanise the party's base, appealing to those seeking a change from the Mnangagwa-dominated leadership.

While he is unlikely to land the presidency, should he manage to negotiate, he will probably ascend to the vice presidency. Political experience, time, vitality, and innovation are his greatest allies.

The sober view

The announcement that Mnangagwa is not interested in pursuing an extension to his term is good news for progressives.

However, it is too early to celebrate; 2028 is still very far, and a day in politics is a very long time. Third-term proponents will burn the midnight candle, looking for the next shenanigan to enable their continued proximity to power and influence.

Be that as it may, successionists have also been emboldened to make moves and manoeuvres as they position themselves. In the next few months, we will see alliances form, shift and consolidate around main contenders.

This is my sober view; I take no prisoners.

Dumani is an independent political analyst. He writes in his personal capacity. — @NtandoDumani.